Welfarism in economic domains by Marhuenda, Francisco & Ginés, Miguel
1Welfarism in Economic Domains l 
M. Ginés 




Departamento de Ecol1ol11ia, Unhwsitat Carlos II!, Madrid 126, 21i903 Cetafi:, Spain 
marhuend(a eco.uc3m.es 
Received August 5. 1997; tinal version received February 1. 1999 
In economies with pub1ic goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give 
a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three 
axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires 
that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents 
should not decrease the welfare 01' any of them. Journal ol Economic Literature 
Classitication Numbers: 063; H41. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The welfarist approach to Social Choice Theory proposes allocating 
re so urce s in such a way that all the information not contained in the utility 
possibility set is ignored. This approach is exemplified in Bargaining 
Theory which studies utility allocation mechanisms defined on an abstract 
setting in which all the relevant information about the agents is sum-
marized in the utility possibility set and a threat point. Characterizing 
those mechanisms by a minimal set of fairness properties is at the core of 
the theory. 
1 We thank L. Corchón, E. Oierker. J. Massó, F. Mertens, J. Naeve, w. Trockel, and an 
anonymous referee for their comments. We are especially indebted to J. Silvestre for discussing 
with us an earlier draft and making insightful suggestions. Financial support from the 
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas and from the Spanish Ministry 01' 
Education Project PB 97-0131 is gratefully acknowledgcd. 
2This line of research has been questioned by J. Roemer [13-15]. 
J. Roemer's critique to Axiomatic Bargaining Theory is based on the obser-
vation that much of the relevant economic information is 10st when the 
problem is presented as one of dividing up utility. 
He pro vides sorne examples of genuinely different economic models 
giving rise to the same utility possibility set and the same threat point. Yet the 
intuition provided by sorne econornic environments may not be valid for others. 
Thus, it is hard to justify the usage of mechanisms which depend only on the 
information contained in the utility possibility set.ln addition, empirical resuIts 
[21] suggest that the notions offairness observed in people are based on more 
information than just that contained in the attainable utilities. 
In [14], 1. Roemer characterizes five classical solutions ofAxiomatic 
Bargaining Theory. He argues that to reconstruct the standard axiomatic 
characterizations of Bargaining Theory, one has to consider commodity 
spaces of unbounded dimensiono And it is no longer clear that the 
economic analogues of the axioms of Bargaining Theory still characterize 
a solution in more realistic and smaller domains. Thus, he views his work 
as " ... demonstrating the lengths to which one must go to preserve the 
axiomatic characterization of the standard bargaining mechanisms on 
economic environments" [14, p. 32]. He concludes that classical Bargaining 
Theory is unacceptable as a positive model of the bargaining process as 
well as a norrnative model of resource allocation. 
The present paper is an atternpt to reconcile sorne of the principIes 
contained in Bargaining Theory with the work of J. Roemer by showing 
that E. Kalai's characterization [4] of the egalitarian solution can be trans-
planted from classical Bargaining Theory into sorne economically meaning-
fuI environments. 
We consider a set of agents endowed with preferences on vectors of 
public goods and a single private good (money), which can be represented 
by quasi-linear utility functions with constant marginal utility in the private 
good. There is a commonly owned technology to produce public goods 
bundles using the private good as an input. The agents differ in their valua-
tions of the public goods and the issue is to design a production plan and 
a financing scheme for it. 
We adopt the point of view of social choice theory in that we seek a 
solution determined by sorne equitable properties. We focus on the three 
key properties considered by Kalai in his characterization of the egalitarian 
solution, Pareto efficiency, symrnetry and monotonicity. The axiorn of 
Pareto optimality needs no modification in our context but, the other two 
have to be reinterpreted within the economic situation at hand. 
The intuition behind the axiom of symmetry is that agents which cannot 
be distinguished with the information available in the model should be 
treated equally. In Bargaining theory this means that if the utility 
3possibility set is symmetric, then all the agents should end up with the 
same utility level. However, here, as in J. Roemer's example, it will be the 
case that different economic situations with genuinely different agents 
correspond to the same utility possibility set. Thus, in the context of our 
modeling, it seems more appropriate to postulate the following axiom: 
whenever all the agents have the same preferences, they should aH pay the 
same amount of private good (of course, the level of the public goods 
enjoyed by the agents is, by definition, the same for aH of them). 
The monotonicity axiom requires that enlarging the set of alternatives 
available to the agents should not hurt any of them. The well known intui-
tion supporting this principIe is that if the pie gets larger, then everybody 
should benefit (perhaps differently) from it. In the quasi-linear world a 
bigger pie corresponds to having a larger surplus to share. However, all the 
agents contribute to the surplus. And it is possible that it becomes larger, 
because of the greater contributions of sorne of the agents, even though 
sorne others reduce their participation in the common project. Is it fair then 
to demand axiomatically that aH of them benefit? To make monotonicity 
more palatable we consider the following modification. If sorne agent raises 
his valuation of the public goods but the rest do not modify their valua-
tions (so total surplus is now higher and nobody contri bu tes less than 
before to it), then the payoff of every agent should not decrease. 
This idea is not entirely new in the literature. It has been used before in 
[ 16-18] in a slightly different form. The reasoning therein is that whenever 
there is a change in the preferences of sorne agents, the ones whose 
preferences remain the same should be affected in the same direction. This 
property is usually referred to as "solidarity" and that is the name we have 
adopted here as well. This concept is also related with the notions of 
population solidarity [20] and skill so Iidarity [3]. 
The main result of our work is to show that on the set of economies with 
qua si-linear preferences, the three axioms we have just discussed determine 
the same rule as in c1assical Bargaining Theory. That is, the welfare 
egalitarian correspondence which splits the surplus equally among the 
agents. We restrict ourselves to standard economic domains with, for 
example, a fixed commodity space and make use of a reduced number of 
axioms. Thus, our findings provide (as in [13-15]) an alternative founda-
tion of welfarism based on economic principies. 
There is a rather extensive literature studying the egalitarian solution in 
addition to Kalai's characterization. R. B. Myerson [11] uses a condition 
on decomposability with respect to sequences of bargaining problems and 
enough invariance under ordinal utility transformations. W. Thomson [20] 
pro vides another characterization in terms of population monotonicity and 
other axioms. Moulin [8] considers social choice functions which share 
equally the surplus aboye a reference utility level. In a related work, 
4H. Moulin and J. Roemer [9J propose three properties, in addition to 
efficiency, which reflect the public and private property rights of the agents. 
y. Sprumont [17J has axiornatized the welfare egalitarian solution by 
means of solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and 
preferences. Whenever a change occurs in the feasibility correspondence 
andjor sorne of the agent's preferences, all the agents whose preferences 
have not changed are sirnilarly affected. In contrast, the axiom of solidarity, 
as presented he re, applies only to a restricted dass of changes in the 
preferences of the agents. In addition, we define welfare egalitarianisrn in 
terrns of the preferences of the agents themselves and not with respect to 
sorne abstract preordering on the space of preferences and indifference 
dasses of allocations as in [17 J. In other words, we insist that the modeling 
and axioms stem directly from the fundamentals of the economic scenario. 
One rnay condude that Bargaining Theory is a rather ambitious project 
with a scope which is unrealistically universal. After all, its proposals apply, 
in principIe, to every conceivable conflict. Yet, sorne of its ideas and intui-
tions are recoverable if we are willing to work at a srnaller scale and incor-
porate the relevant econornic considerations into the model. Of course, the 
price one has to pay is a loss in the universality of the fairness properties, 
which might now depend on the econornic context of interest. 
2. THE MODEL 
We consider an economy with one private good and several public 
goods. The consurnption set of the private good is ~ and the space of 
public goods2 is Y = ~: = {y E ~m : y;?: O}. These are produced by means 
of a technology jointly owned by the agents. The production possibilities 
are described by a function e: Y --> ~ + measuring the cost of producing 
each bundle of public goods in terrns of the single private good of the 
econorny. Throughout this paper we will consider a fixed cost function e 
satisfying the following. 
Assumption 2.1. The mapping e is lower sernicontinuous3 , non decreasing, 
satisfies c( O) = O and 
l · . f el y) 1m In -'- = + (X;. 
Ilyll ~ +00 Ilyll 
2 Given two vectors x, ~ in sorne Euclidean spaee, W;., the notation x;'::. (resp. x»::.) 
means that Xi;' Zi (resp. Xi> Zi) for every i = 1, ... , p. We write x> z to indicate that x;' z and 
x # z. Finally, x::r z means that Xi ~ Zi for sorne i = 1, ... , p. 
3 A mapping e: Y --> [R; is lower semicontinuous iffor ea eh Z E Y we havef(::.) ~ Iim infy~z f( y). 
A lowcr semicontinuous function is bounded below on every compact set and attains its 
minimum value. 
5Assumption 2.1 allows for technologies with jumps, so initial fixed costs 
are not ruled out in the model. The limit condition precludes increasing 
returns to scale in the economy for very large bundles of public goods, but 
does not restrict the technology on a bounded set of goods. 
We let N = {1, 2 ... , n} denote the set of agents with consumption set 
X¡ = lR, for i E N. We let X = X¡ x '" X X n • An allocation (z; t) = 
(z; t¡, ... , t n ) E Yx X is feasible whenever c(z) ~ L:7= ¡ ti and ti ~ W¡ for all 
i E N. Here, W¡ is the initial endowment of private good of agent i E N. The 
preference relation of agent i = 1, ... , n is represented by a quasi-linear 
utility function 4 u¡(y; t) = n¡(y) + W¡ - tí' with (y; t) = (y; t ¡, ... , tn) E Yx X 
and ni: Y --> lR. Hence, u¡(y; t) is the utility obtained by agent i E N when 
the bundle y E Y of public goods is implemented and he has to contribute 
the amount t¡ towards, its financing. For convenience, we write u¡(y; t) as 
depending on t = (t ¡, ... , t n) E X even though agent i E N is interested only in 
the consumption of the public goods and his private good so, for n¡, ... , nn 
and W¡, ... , Wn fixed, u;(y; t) depends only on y E Y and ti E Xi' The 
following assumption is made on the preferences of the agents. 
Assumption 2.2. F or each i = 1, ... , n, n ¡: Y --> lR + is a continuous, non-
decreasing function satisfying n;(O) = O and 
l . n¡(y) ¡m sup --< oo. 
Ilyll ~ 00 11 yll 
There are several interpretations for the mappings n ¡, ... , n n and we do 
not adhere necessarily to any of them. On the one hand, the amount n¡(y) 
represents the valuation that agent i E N has of the public goods y. One can 
also think of it as representing his private technology to exploit those 
public goods or the benefit (in terms of the private good) he would obtain 
if he could enjoy those public goods for free. If the status quo is no con-
sumption of any of the public goods, then n ¡( y) is also the maximum 
amount of his private good that he is willing to pay for the consumption 
of the bundle y. 
On the other hand, n¡(y) + Wi - t¡ is the net benefit agent i E N obtains 
when he has to contribute t ¡ units of his private good in order to enjoy the 
bundle y of public goods. Thus, n¡(y) + W¡ - t¡ is also the net contribution 
that agent i E N makes towards the total surplus, L:7= ¡ (n¡(y) + w¡) - c(y), 
that the society obtains from the consumption of the bundle y E Y of public 
goods. 
We refer to a vector of utility functions n=(n¡, ... , nn) as a pro file of 
utilities and we use the notation W = (w¡, ... , w n) and u( y; t) = u(n. W)( y; t) = 
(u¡(y;t), ... ,un(y;t))=(n¡(y)+w¡-t¡, ... ,nn(y)+wn-tn). The vector of 
4 Sametimes, we will write u7 ar u\rr,w,) to emphasize the dependence al' u an rr and/or (o, 
6utilities resulting from n = (n ¡, ... , nn) when n; is replaced by the new utility 
function V; is denoted by (n_;,v;)=(n¡, ... , n;_¡, V;, n;+¡, ... , nn) (and 
Iikewise, for endowments w). Given two utility profiles n and v defined on 
y we say that n): v whenever n( y) ): v( y) for every y E Y. 
DEFINITION 2.3. Given n and w, a feasible allocation (y; t) E Yx X 
is Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible allocation (z; r) E Yx X 
such that u( y; t) < u( z; r). The set of those Pareto optimal allocations 
(y; t) E Y x X satisfying n ¡ (y) - t ¡ = ... = n n( y) - t n is the set of all welfare 
egalitarian allocations. 
Note that the welfare egalitarian allocations equate the surplus obtained 
from the public goods ignoring the initial differences in endowments. Thus, 
we are considering w to be the disagreement point or status qua: if the 
public project is not developed, every agent keeps his initial endowment of 
the private good and this is the minimum welfare level guaranteed by the 
welfare egalitarian correspondence. The solution pro po sed aboye suggests 
to equate the welfare gains of the agents aboye the disagreement point. 
An alternative definition might be to require that ni (y) + w ¡ - ti = ... = 
nn(y) + W n - tn- We will discuss other differences between these two 
possibilities at the end of Section 3. 
The welfare egalitarian correspondence is essentially unique since the 
agents are indifferent among the various allocations in it. However, as the 
next example shows, it might be empty. 
EXAMPLE 2.4. Let us take the technology e( y) = y2 and the utility 
functions 
if 0:( y:( 1 
if y): 1 
if O:(y:(1 
if y):1. 
Assume first, that the vector of initial endowments w = (w¡, W2) satisfies 
1/4:( W¡ + W 2 :( 1. Then, one check s easily that the set of Pareto optimal 
allocations is given by {(y; ti' t2): 1/2:(y, c(y):(w¡ +W2' t¡ +t2=c(y), 
t2 = W2} = {( y; y2 - W2' w 2): 1/2:(y:( Jw¡ + w 2}. Hence, the set U¡ = 
{(n¡(y)-t¡, n2(y)-t2): (y;t l ,t2) is Pareto optimal}={(y-y2+ w2 , 
lOy - W2): 1/2:( y:( J WI + W2} does not contain any points of the form 
n ¡ (y) - t ¡ = n 2( y) - t 2, i.e., there are no welfare egalitarian allocations in 
this economy. 
On the other hand, ifw¡ +W2): 1, then the set P= {(y; ti, t2): t¡ +t2= 
1, t;:(w;, i= 1, 2} is al so a subset ofthe Pareto optimal allocations. Thus, 
the set U 2 = {( n ¡ (l ) - t ¡, n2(l ) - t2 ): (y; t ¡, t 2) E P} = { (l - t ¡, 9 + t ¡): 1 -
w2 :( t ¡ :( w¡} is al so a subset of the set of utilities attained via Pareto 
7optimal allocations. And we see that as long as W 2 ~ 5 there are (y; t 1, t2 ) E P 
for which n1(y)-t 1 =n2(y)-t 2 . 
The above example illustrates two issues which arise from the introduc-
tion of initial endowments. The first one is rather technical: the Pareto 
optimal allocations do not necessarily correspond to difIerent distributions 
of the cost of the bundle(s) optimizing the surplus L7~ 1 n¡(y) - c(y) of the 
economy. This statement holds only for Pareto optimal allocations (y; t) 
for which t» W (see [1]). 
More substantially for our purposes, t shows that whenever the total 
resources W 1 + ... + W n are scarce, it can be the case that the Pareto 
frontier does not contain any welfare egalitarian allocations. Since, these 
allocations are the focus of this work, we introduce next a new hypothesis 
which guarantees there existence. 
Assumption 2.5. For each y such that L7~ 1 n¡(y) - c(y) ~ 0, the 
inequalities5 wk>nk(y) for all kEN and L7~1 w¡>c(y) hold. 
By Assumption 2.5 there are enough private resources to carry out the 
optimal plan of public goods and to make payment transfers of the private 
good among the agents. Example 2.4 shows that the welfare egalitarian 
correspondence might be empty unless something like Assumption 2.5 
holds. Nevertheless, we can dispose of Assumption 2.5 provided we are 
willing to allow negative consumption of the private good. 6 We will not do 
so, since in the present framework of interpersonal comparison of utilities, 
it seems reasonable to take into account the efIects that the initial distribu-
tion of endowments might have on the welfare attained by the agents. 
For a fixed technology c, for which Assumption 2.1 holds, an economy 
is defined to be a pair (n, w) consisting of a vector of u tili ty profiles n = 
(n 1 , ••• , nn) verifying Assumption 2.2 and a vector of initial endowments 
W = (w 1 , ... , w n ) satisfying Assumption 2.5. We let E denote the set of such 
economies. A mechanism is a function R: E ....... Y x X which assigns to every 
economy (n, w) E E a feasible allocation R(n, w) = (y(n, w); t(n, w)). We 
denote by P( n, w) (resp. W( n, w)) the set of Pareto optimal (resp. welfare 
egalitarian) allocations. 
LEMMA 2.6. Let (n, w) E E. Then, W(n, w) =1= 0. 
Proof By Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, there is a solution, say y, to the 
maximization problem max{L7~ 1 n¡(y) - c(y): y E Y}. By Assumption 2.5, 
we have that ik = nk('y) - ~(L7~ 1 n¡(y) - c(y)) < Wk' Thus, the allocation 
5 By Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, the inequality L7~ I n¡( y) - c(y) ~ O holds only on a bounded 
set of public goods. 
6 This is the standard assumption with quasi-linear preferences (see, for example. [7]). 
8(ji; i) is feasible and satisfies n¡{j) - ti = nj(ji) - ti for aH i, j E N. Since, it 
is Pareto optimal (see [1]) it is also welfare egalitarian. I 
The problem faced by the agents is to find "the optimal" bundle of public 
goods and a fair share of its cost. According to the normative approach an 
"acceptable" mechanism should satisfy certain equitable requirements. The 
principIes which we propose here are described by the foHowing three 
properties. 
Axioms 2.7. For every (n, w)EE, 
(i) R(n,w)EP(n,w). 
(ii) If n¡= ... =nn and W¡= ... =Wn then, u¡(R(n,w))= ... = 
un(R(n, w)). 
(iii) If n): v and w): (J, then u(n,w)(R(n, w)) -w): u(v'O')(R(v, (J)) -(J. 
Properties (i) and (ii) reflect, respectively, the notions of Pareto 
efficiency and symmetry. They are standard in the literature, so we will 
make no further comment about them. The novelty here lies on Axiom 2.7 
(iii). This is akin to the requirement of No Disposal of Utilities as stated 
in [8]. An equivalent statement is that if n io ): Vio and w io ): (Jio' for some 
io E N, then u(n, w)( R(n, w)) - w): u(v, 0')( R( v, (J)) - (J for the vectors of 
utilities and endowments n = (n_ io ' Vio) and w = (w- io ' (Jio)' Thus, it reduces 
to comparisons involving only changes of preferences and endowments in 
one agent. 
We note that Property 2.7(iii) focuses on increases in gains u(R(n, w)) 
- w, with respect to the status quo w, as n and w vary. We might also con-
sider the possibility of studying changes in the total welfare u( R( n, w)) of 
the agents with respect to variations in n and w. This is addressed at the 
end of the next section. 
One possible interpretation of this axiom is that if, after reaching an 
agreement, one of the agents finds out that he can increase the benefit he 
obtains from the public goods, then he is entitled to a larger share of the 
surplus (since he contributes a greater amount to it) as long as this does 
not affect negatively the others. It is in this sense that Axiom 2.7 is called 
a solidarity axiom: An increase in the skill of one agent benefits the whole 
society, or at least does not hurt the other members. In particular, if one 
interprets the mappings n ¡, ... , nn as the private technology used by the 
agents to exploit the public goods then, no agent will oppose technological 
advancement by others. 
Thus, the axiom of solidarity is akin to the monotonicity property of 
Axiomatic Bargaining Theory. One may justify it on the basis that, since 
the technology to produce the public goods is jointIy owned by all the 
agents, they are forced to cooperate in agreeing both on a single bundle of 
9public goods and a financing plan for it. At the end of the next section we 
will come back to a further discussion 01' this issue. 
Remark 2.8. To simplify the treatment, given a quasi-linear preference 
relation -< ¡, we are fixing the unique utility function representation 
n¡{y)+w¡-t¡ such that n;(O) =0 and we work with this representation. 
Nevertheless, we point out that our solution concept Wand properties 2.7 
can be given an ordinal meaning which is independent of the chosen 
representation. 
For example, it is easy to show that property 2.7(iii) is an ordinal 
axiom. To see this, consider for each agent i E N, a (quasi-linear) preference 
relation -< ¡, defined on Y x IR. Given y E Y, define T -< i (y) E IR to be the 
unique real number such that (y, O) ~ (O, T -<i(y)) (With the normalization 
aboye in place we have that T-<i(y) = 7r¡(Y)). Then, Axiom 2.7(iii) can be 
stated as follows: Let R(-<, w)=(y(-<, w); t(-<, w)) and R(-<', u)= 
(y( -<', u); t( -<', u)l. If w ~ u and T -< i (y) ~ T -<; (y) for all y E Y and i E N, 
then T-<i(Y(-<,W))-t;(-<,w)~T-<;(y(-<"U))-ti(-<"U) for all iEN. 
Likewise, a feasible allocation (ji; i) is welfare egalitarian if and only if it 
is Pareto optimal and T -< i (ji) - i¡ = T -<j (ji) - ij for all i, j E N. 
As we have already noticed, even though W( n, w) might contain several 
allocations, the agents are indifferent among them. Clearly any selection 
from W satisfies Axioms 2.7. The content of the next result is that this is 
essentially the only way to obtain a mechanism satisfying those properties. 
THEOREM 2.9. A mechanism R satisfies Axioms 2.7 if and only ir 
R(n,w)E W(n,w)for every (n,w)EE. 
The result aboye admits also a negative interpretation. One may ask 
whether it is possible that increasing the skill that sorne agents have to 
profit from the public goods benefits only (or perhaps mostly) those agents 
responsible for the larger surplus, without hurting the others. Theorem 2.9 
shows that this is incompatible with Pareto efficiency and symmetry. 
We address now the proof of Theorem 2.9. We will show that every 
mechanism satisfying Axiom 2.7 has to be a selection of the welfare 
egalitarian correspondence. 
Proof of Theorem 2.9. Let R be a mechanism satisfying Axiom 2.7 and 
let R( n, w) = (ji; f) E Y x X. The proof proceeds in three steps. 
Step 1. Choose another economy with the same endowment w and a 
profile of utilities v( y) such that v ~ 7r and v;( z) = n ¡( ji) is constant for 
every z ~ ji. Then, u"(j;r) = u v(j;f) and by Axiom 2.7 (iii) u V( R( v, w)) ~ 
u"(j;f)=uV(ji;f). Since, R(V,W)EP(V,W) then u"(j;f)=uV(R(v,w)) and 
we may assume that R( v, w) = (j; f) as wel1. 
10
Step 2. Choose y* large enough such that y*» ji and c(y*) > 
n max { v, (ji), ... , V n (ji)} . Let 8> O be a real number su eh that (1 - 8) y* 
» ji and ehoose a utility pro file (( y) sueh that the following eonditions 
hold. 
(i) (, = ... =(11" 
(ii) ((z) = O for every z l' (1- 8) y*. 
(iii) ((z)=((y*) for every z~y*. 
(iv) For eaeh ¡EN, the solution to max{(¡(z)-c(z): ZE Y} 1S 
attained at the point y*. 
(v) ((z) > v(z) for every z ~ y*. 
(vi) ¿;'~, (¡(y*) - c(y*) = ¿7~, v¡(ji) - C(Ji) = ¿;'~, TC¡(ji) - c(ji). 
We indieate next (see Fig. 1) how it is possible to eonstruet the functions 
(" ... , (/1" First, note that to obtain (iv) one only needs to make the func-
tions (, = ... = (11 "steep" enough in the regio n between (1 - 8) Y * and y *. 
Choose now initial endowments (J, = ... = (JII large enough so that 
c(y*):::; ¿;'~, (J¡. lt follows from (iv) that the only Pareto optimal alloea-
tions are ofthe form (y*; r*) for some r* EX. Hence, R((, (J)= (y*; r*) for 
some r*EXsuch that c(Y*)=¿¡ENr;*. Now define (,(y*)= ... =(II(Y*) 
so that ¿;'~, (¡(y*) - c{y*) = ¿7~, v¡(ji) - c(ji) ~ o. If necessary, inerease 
(J so that (J¡ ~ (¡(y*). In addition, (,(y*) + ... + (n(Y*) ~ c(y*) > 
n max { v, (ji), ... , V n(ji)}, so (v) also holds. N ow (ii) and (iii) define the func-
tions (, = ... = (11 on the whole space. lt follows from (i) and Axiom 2.7{ii) 
that rt = ... =r,;. 
III 
1 II ~O = ~(Y*) 
y* 
(1 - é)Y* 
~(-) = O 
FIGURE 1 
11
Step 3. Take the vector ofutilities f3¡(z) =max{ v¡(z), ¿¡(z)}, i= 1, ... , n 
and the same endowments a as in step 2. We also choose e> O in there 
smaH enough so that, for each i = 1, ... , n, the solution to the problem 
max 
s.1. 
f3,(y) - c(y) } 
y~(1-e)y* (2.1 ) 
is attained at the point y* (Note that, by (v) in step 2, #(z) = ¿(z) if z is 
close enough to y*.) 
Let (y; f) = R(f3, a). The theorem will foHow if we can prove that f3(y)-
'=v(Y)-r=¿(y*)-r*. To see this. note first that by Axiom2.7(iii) we 
have that #(y)-,~v(Y)-fand f3(.Y)-'~¿(y*)-r*. We consider three 
cases. 
(a) Assume first that y ~ y*. Then, by (v) we have that fJ(y) = 
¿(ji) ~ v(y) and ¿(y) -, = f3(.Y) -, ~ ¿(y*) - r*. Since (y; n = R(f3, a) is 
also feasible in the economy (¿, a) and (y*; r*) = R(¿, a) E P(¿, a), then 
f3(y) -, = ¿(y*) - r*. 
(b) Suppose now that y ::r(l-e) y*. Then, from (ii) we see that 
f3(y)=v(y)~¿(y) and v(.Y)-'=#(.Y)-'~v(jI)-f. Hence, 2:7=1 v¡{y)-
c(.Y) ~ O so, by Assumption 2.5, c(y) ~ 2:7= 1 w¡ and y is feasible in the 
economy (v, w). But, if sorne inequality is strict, then (Y; f) would not be 
Pareto optimal in the economy (v, w). Hence, f3( y) -, = v(Y) - f = 
n(y) - f. 
(c) Otherwise, y ~ (1 - e) y* and y ::r y*, so Y is in regio n 1I of Fig. l. 
Then, by Eq. (2.1), we have Uy*) - c(y*) = f3¡(y*) - c(y*) ~ f3¡(y) - c( y), 
for aH iEN. Since, f3(.9)-'~¿(y*)-r*, c(y)=2:7=1'¡ and c(y*)= 
2:7=1 ri, it must be the case that f3(Y)-'=¿(y*)-r*. 
In either ofthe three cases, the claim foHows from 2:7=1 (¿¡(y*)-rn= 
2:7=1 (v¡{y)-f¡) and f3¡(.Y)=max{UY),v¡(y)} for aH i=l, ... ,n. Thus, 
n(Y)-f=¿(y*)-r*. But, by Axiom 2.7(iii), Uy*)-r¡*=¿j(y*)-rt for 
aH i, j E N. Hence, we must also have n ¡( y) - f¡ = nj ( y) - fj for aH i, j E N, 
so R(n, w) E W(n, w) and the theorem foHows. I 
3. PRIVA TE GOODS 
We argued in Section 2 that Axiom 2.3(iii) can be justified in a 
cooperative setting and it is interpreted as sorne type of solidarity among 
the agents. In this section we elaborate further on this issue and present 
a different economic context in which the characterization result of the 
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previous section does not translate. As we will see, in an economic 
environment in which agents do not have any incentives to coordinate their 
decisions, the solidarity Axiom 2.3(iii) does no longer determine a unique 
solution. Thus, imposing this requirement has bite only whenever sorne 
degree of cooperation among the agents is necessary. 
Formally (though not conceptually), the model we consider now is a 
slight modification of the one studied in the previous section. We abandon 
now the setting of public goods and let Y¡ = IR: be the space of (produced) 
private goods consumed by agent i E N. That is, we assume that the sets 
Xl, ... , X n , represent, as in Section 2, the spaces of sorne private good which 
can be used, by means of a public technology e, to produce a bundle of 
goods y E ¿7~ 1 Y¡. The key difference with the previous section is that the 
new vector y is no longer a bundle of public goods, but it has to be divided 
y = i + ... + yn E Y 1 + ... + Yn among the agents who consume them. 
Thus, in contrast with Section 2, a feasible allocation consists now of a 
vector (y1, ... , yn; t) E Y1 X .•. X Yn X y such that t ~ W and C(y1 + ... + yn) 
= ti + ... + t n. The rest of the model and the assumptions made in the last 
section are translated readily into this new scenario. The question now is 
whether the equivalent of Theorem 2.9 holds in the setting of private goods. 
To see that this is not the case consider a linear technology, so that 
c( y + z) = c( y) + c( z). For each utility profile u = (u l' ... , Un) and initial dis-
tribution of endowment W we let, for each i E N, (/ (u¡, w¡), t¡( U¡, W¡)) E 
Y¡ X X¡ be the solution to agent ts maximization problem 
rnax ~¡(r~¡)} 
s. t. (( y ) - t ¡ . 
t¡~w¡ 
Then, the mechanisrn s: E --+ Y1 X ..• X Yn X X assigning the allocation S( u, w) 
=(i(U1,W1), ... ,yn(un,Wn);t1(U1,W¡), ... ,tn(un,wn)) to every economy 
(u, w), verifies properties 2.7 but is not welfare egalitarian. 
The difference between public versus private goods is that in the first 
case agents are forced to come up with sorne cornrnon identical bundle, 
consumed by all of thern. On the other hand, with private goods, the linear 
technology allows each of them to behave individualistically; in such a way 
that the different solutions proposed by each of the agents are compatible. 
This example shows that one has to be careful when postulating the prin-
cipIes of Bargaining Theory within economic environments. As pointed out 
by the work of Roemer [14], sorne of those axioms might be reasonable 
in sorne settings but completely unjustified for others. In particular, the 
characterization results might hold only for sorne, very concrete family of 
rnodels but not for all them. In this sen se, the price paid for getting around 
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J. E. Roemer's critique and making the principies ofAxiomatic Bargaining 
Theory applicable to economic scenarios is a loss in its universal character. 
To finish we remar k that our formulation for Axiom 2.7(iii) distributes 
the surplus aboye the initial endowments L7~ 1 n¡(ji) - c(ji) equally among 
the agents and each agent j E N enjoys a utility equivalent to the consump-
tion of no public good and the amount w j + ~(L7~ 1 n¡( ji) - c(ji)) of the 
priva te goods. However the total surplus of the agents is in fact S = 
L7~ 1 (n¡{ji) + w¡} - c(ji). Another seemingly reasonable alternative might 
be to distribute total surplus S, including the initial endowment of private 
goods, among the agents so that all of them would end up with the same 
equivalent consumption of the private good. Let us call this solution W* 
so, (y*; t) E W*(n, w) if it is Pareto optimal and u¡(y*; t) = S/n for all 
agents i E N. 
It is easy to see that W* does not satisfy Property 2.7(iii). Nevertheless, 
it does comply with another very similar property which, at first sight, 
might be more natural than Property 2.7(iii). Namely, 
if n ~ v and w~CJ, then u(n.w)(R(n, w)) ~ u(v.a)(R(v, CJ)). 
Note that the original welfare egalitarian correspondence W defined in 
Definition 2.3 also satisfies this alternative property. Hence, with this new 
axiom substituting Axiom 2.7(iii), there is no longer a unique solution. So, 
if we were to use the aboye property instead ofAxiom 2.7(iii), we would 
need a fourth axiom to specify a solution. (One could, for example, specify 
what happens when there are no public goods.) 
Let us argue that our proposal W is more appropriate for the present set 
up than the other seemingly reasonable alternative W*. We have just seen 
that, in the absence of public goods, equal distribution does not seem to 
have the same support in terms of the fairness principies that we have 
discussed here. 
So, consider the extreme case in which public goods do not matter at all 
for the welfare of the society. That is, suppose that n¡ = O for all i E N. For 
this particular example, our solution W proposes the status quo allocation 
(O; O); i.e., no public good is implemented an each agent retains his initial 
endowment of private goods. On the other hand, W* would also dictate 
not to produce any public goods but it would still recommend to distribute 
the initial endowments equally among the agents. With no real incentives 
to cooperate, it does not seem so reasonable to expect that sorne agents 
would fee! compelled to give away part of the their private endowment. 
A similar argument shows also that, under the mechanism W*, there will 
be situations in which sorne agents would be better off by keeping their 
initial endowment and not participating in the common project. Thus, W* 
fails also to provide sorne minimum individual rationality incentives. 
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